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Public cloud storage services are becoming prevalent and myriad data sharing, archiving
and collaborative services have emerged which harness the pay-as-you-go business model
of public cloud. To ensure privacy and confidentiality often encrypted data is outsourced to
such services, which further complicates the process of accessing relevant data by using
search queries. Search over encrypted data schemes solve this problem by exploiting cryptographic primitives and secure indexing to identify outsourced data that satisfy the search
criteria. Almost all of these schemes rely on exact matching between the encrypted data
and search criteria. A few schemes which extend the notion of exact matching to similarity
based search, lack realism as those schemes rely on trusted third parties or due to increase
storage and computational complexity. In this paper we propose Oblivious Similarity based
Search (OS2) for encrypted data. It enables authorized users to model their own encrypted
search queries which are resilient to typographical errors. Unlike conventional methodologies, OS2 ranks the search results by using similarity measure offering a better search
experience than exact matching. It utilizes encrypted bloom filter and probabilistic homomorphic encryption to enable authorized users to access relevant data without revealing results
of search query evaluation process to the untrusted cloud service provider. Encrypted
bloom filter based search enables OS2 to reduce search space to potentially relevant
encrypted data avoiding unnecessary computation on public cloud. The efficacy of OS2 is
evaluated on Google App Engine for various bloom filter lengths on different cloud
configurations.

1 Introduction
We are living through an era of data intensive applications in which digital data is doubling
almost every eighteen months [1]. With the emergence of Big data, companies ranging from
small to large scale enterprises are trying to make most out of the data gathered from their
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customers and business processes [2]. Data ranging from sharable (social network data) to
confidential (personal healthcare records) in nature are processed and analyzed by tools and
technologies which enable Big data [3], [4]. In the context of data management, cloud based
storage services are becoming prevalent as these services offer cost effective solutions to persist,
process and provision large amount of data following the notion of pay-as-you-go business
model. With virtualized and on-demand provisioning of cloud infrastructure (i.e., networking
facility, computation power, and storage capacity) these services enable their subscribers to
scale storage and computational facilities according to their requirements.
Since, these services are offered through untrusted cloud service providers there is a great
risk of privacy infringement when personal and confidential data are outsourced to such services [5], [6], [7]. Personal health records, financial statements and business plans are few
examples of sensitive data which can seriously affects the lives of individuals and businesses, if
compromised. The most obvious solution to ensure data privacy is to always outsource data in
encrypted form and share the corresponding decryption keys with authorized users to whom
data is shared [8], [9]. Although encrypted data (we refer outsourced data as encrypted data,
and throughout the text in subsequent sections they are used interchangeably) restrains cloud
server provider from compromising privacy of the data; however, it significantly reduces the
capabilities of a user to access relevant data by using conventional search queries [10], [11].
Besides this, the scope of privacy related issues are not limited to the outsourced data only,
cloud service provider can use deductive reasoning to learn private and confidential information about the data owner i.e., if outsourced clinical reports of a user are accessed by a medical
doctor specialized in diabetes mellitus, cloud service provider can deduce that there is a possibility that user is a diabetic patient.
Cloud service providers charge their subscribers (users) according to the magnitude of service usage i.e., network, storage and processing [12], [13]. To ensure efficient utilization of
cloud infrastructure it is very important for subscribers of a cloud storage to access only relevant data. Since, outsourced data is in encrypted form conventional search queries cannot be
used to identify relevance between the outsourced data and search criteria. However, to solve
the problem of searching encrypted data sizable number of systems and algorithms have been
proposed which are generally referred as search over encrypted data schemes [14]. These
schemes either exploit the cryptographic primitives or indexing methodologies to search outsourced data. Schemes that primarily focus on cryptography utilize trapdoors defined over the
encrypted data—a trapdoor is defined for a particular keyword and is shared with authorized
subscribers to search outsourced data [15], [16]. Whereas, indexing based schemes utilize keyword extraction algorithms to identify important words (index) from the outsourced data and
then store them either in a trusted domain (trusted third party) or in semi-trusted domain
where it cannot be linked with the outsourced data i.e., semi-trusted entity persisting index
does not collude with the cloud service provider provisioning the outsourced data [17], [18],
[19].
So far, search over encrypted data schemes have focused on ensuring privacy of the data
and search queries. For search query evaluation these schemes mainly consider exact matching
between the outsourced data and search criteria. Consequently, these schemes are only able to
retrieve outsourced data where there is an exact match between the trapdoor and outsourced
data (trapdoor based cryptography [15], [16]) or search criteria and index computed from the
outsourced data (index based encrypted data search [20]). This notion of exact matching is
completely different than what is used in real world to search data over the internet and for
querying conventional database i.e., identifying similarity between the data and search criteria.
Thus, a search scheme which can provide similarity based search over encrypted data would
greatly elevate the search experience of cloud storage subscribers by assisting them in accessing
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relevant outsourced data even if search criteria is marginally erroneous to be matched with the
outsource data i.e., typographical errors or misspelled keywords.
A few schemes have been proposed focusing on similarity based searching for encrypted
data. These schemes either rely on edit distance based measures to realize encrypted search
queries which are resilient to typographical errors [21] or employ secure probabilistic dimension reduction to measure the similarity between the outsourced data and search criteria [10].
Although these schemes realize privacy-aware data search which do not reveal any information
about the outsourced data and search criteria; however, malicious query evaluator (cloud service provider) can still learn the result of query evaluation process i.e., relevance measure
between the outsourced data and search criteria. Result of query evaluation process can be
exploited by employing deductive reasoning (as described earlier) to passively compromise
privacy of the outsourced data and data owner as well. Besides the passive attack, these
schemes mainly rely on assumptions which either do not align with the real world or are computationally infeasible. Pre-computing all possible typographical errors of a word would
greatly effect the computational load and storage capacity as query evaluator would have to
match search criteria with every possible pre-computed encrypted typographical error. Secure
probabilistic dimension reduction rely on engaging two cloud service providers, one for persisting outsourced data and second for evaluating encrypted search queries.
To realize privacy-aware relevant data access by using encrypted search queries in this
paper we propose oblivious similarity based searching for encrypted data (OS2). Unlike conventional search over encrypted data, OS2 realizes similarity based search which utilize a realvalued function quantifying the similarity between the outsourced data and search criteria
instead of merely stating binary values i.e., matched or unmatched. Besides this, OS2 restrains
malicious cloud service provider to passively compromise privacy of the outsourced data and
data owner, by learning the result of search query evaluation. In contrast with conventional
search over encrypted data methodologies, OS2 does not rely on trusted or semi-trusted third
parties to process encrypted search queries. Basic building blocks of OS2 are encrypted bloom
filter [22] constructed from n-grams and probabilistic homomorphic encryption [23]. These
building blocks ensure end-to-end privacy-aware search for cloud based storage services without relying on trusted or semi-trusted third party to process search queries.

1.1 Main idea
The main idea of OS2 can be explained using following realistic scenario in which multiple
users are collaborating over confidential data, outsourced to an untrusted cloud service provider in an encrypted form.
Suppose Alice is a neurosurgeon working in a national hospital. She is an expert in acute
neurological problems and treats patients suffering from neurological disorders. She is also
actively involved in clinical research to discover new medicines and their effects on patients.
With the consent of her patients she complies a comprehensive report for each of her patients.
Her assistant Bob is responsible for meticulously compiling the reports, which include daily
clinical and non-clinical observations and medical history over the period of treatment.
Mallory is a senior research fellow at a medical research institute. She is interested in conducting a comprehensive study on Alzheimers and Parkinsons diseases. For that she is collaborating with Alice with an understanding that Alice will share reports of her patients (reports
compiled by Bob) and Mallory will share her clinical findings. To efficiently collaborate and
share data both Alice and Mallory subscribe to a cloud based storage service managed by Eve.
To ensure data confidentiality Alice and Mallory have decided to outsource encrypted data,
and share necessary cryptographic primitives and keys. Since, Eve charges her subscribers on
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amount of data consumed on each data access request, an encrypted data structure is also outsourced to Eve’s cloud. Encrypted data structure is designed to ensure that search results are
resilient to typographical errors and results can be ranked according to their relevance to the
search criteria.
Alice and Mallory search the outsourced data by using a search criteria transformed to an
encrypted search query before submitting to Eve. Encrypted search query is used to learn the
similarity between the encrypted data structure and search criteria. The entire process of
search query evaluation is executed by Eve; however, its result is oblivious to her. This ensures
that Eve cannot learn any useful information from the search results, which can lead to potential loss of data privacy. Since, only Alice and Mallory have exchanged necessary cryptographic
keys, a malicious subscriber colluded with Eve cannot query encrypted data structure
successfully.

1.2 Contributions
In this paper with OS2 we make the following contributions in the area of search over
encrypted data within the domain of untrusted cloud based storage services:
• Bloom filter based oblivious search for encrypted data, which can evaluate a real-valued similarity function to measure relevance between the outsourced data and search criteria.
• Reduced number of unnecessary comparison operations between the outsourced data and
search criteria. Auxiliary information about the bloom filter bit locations is utilized to minimize the search space.
• Oblivious search evaluation without relying on any trusted or semi-trusted third party which
ensures efficient utilization of cloud infrastructure. Oblivious evaluation of search query
restrains cloud service provider from passively deducing confidential information which
cannot be learned from the outsourced data otherwise.
It is worth mentioning that Eu-Jin Goh proposed first bloom filter based search [24]. It
used trapdoors defined for specific keywords to retrieve matching documents i.e., exact match
between the trapdoor and bloom filters (document indexes). However, the contribution of
OS2 is the novel use of sliding window (please refer to Section 4) with bloom filters to evaluate
relevance based outsourced data and search criteria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related work in the area
of encrypted data search for untusted domains. Section 3 presents the system models, design
goals and assumptions. Section 4 describes the proposed methodology of oblivious similarity
based search (OS2). Section 5 explains the implementation details of similarity based search
for untrusted cloud service provider. Section 6 presents the evaluation results of OS2 on Google App Engine. Section 7 presents the security analysis of OS2. Section 8 concludes the paper
along with future directions in the context of oblivious similarity based search for encrypted
data.

2 Related work
We categorize OS2 as a secure content discovery service within in an untrusted domain rather
than a new cryptosystem which provides trapdoor based search for encrypted data. OS2 leverages subscribers of a public cloud based storage service to obliviously learn relevance between
their defined search queries and outsourced data. This section presents existing schemes to
search encrypted data, some of them exploit the cryptographic primitives; whereas, others
focus on secure indexes to exactly match search criteria with the outsourced data. We mainly
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focus on efficacy of these schemes to retrieve relevant outsourced data and involvement of
external entities to ensure privacy. We also examine the possibility of a passive attacks if
untrusted entity (cloud service provider) learns result of a search query.
Searchable encryption based on symmetric encryption called searchable symmetric key
cryptography (SKC) was first proposed by Song et al., [15]. SKC defines a trapdoor for a particular keyword which is then used to learn exact matching between the trapdoor and encrypted
data. Based on SKC several schemes have been proposed which utilize trapdoor based encryption to search encrypted index, instead of the data [25, 26, 27]. Similar to SKC, public key cryptography (PKC) was first proposed by Boneh et al., [16]. PKC enables trapdoor evaluation for
data encrypted with asymmetric encryption. Both SKC and PKC rely on trapdoor evaluation
function which can only learn exact matching between the search criteria (trapdoor) and
encrypted data. In the context of public cloud based data sharing services these schemes
require exchange of trapdoors between the data owner and authorized subscribers. Besides
this, each trapdoor is defined for a particular keyword only, it greatly effects the searching
capability of authorized subscribers as they can only search encrypted data for limited number
of keywords.
Authorized private keyword search (APKS) over encrypted personal records was proposed
by Li et al., [17]. In their proposed scheme they utilize Trusted Third Party (TTP) to distribute
capabilities (trapdoors) to authorized subscribers according to their access privileges. These
capabilities are then used to learn exact matching between the trapdoors and personal health
records. Similar to SKC and PKC, APKS offers a limited search experience as authorized subscribers can only search for those keywords for which trapdoors are defined by the data owner.
Wang et al., [28] proposed a trapdoor based relevance search over encrypted data persisted in
an untrusted domain. However, their scheme is only limited to a single trapdoor based search
query. Thus, lacking realism for searching relatively huge amount of data where there is a need
to learn relevance according to multiple search criterion.
Searchable cryptographic cloud storage system (CS2) proposed search over encrypted data
focusing dynamic updates of the outsourced data [29]. CS2 search encrypted data by evaluating an exact matching function between encrypted inverted index and search criteria. However, CS2 is only confined to personal cloud based storage service and is not applied for cloudbased data sharing and collaboration services. Similary, [30] proposed a secure and efficient
update scheme for encrypted data search. As with the other schemes, [30] performed search
operations over the encrypted index; however, the proposed scheme was only confined to
search query evaluation using binary operation of matched and unmatched search criteria—it
cannot be extended to learn relevance between search query and encrypted index.
To incorporate multiple keyword search over encrypted data, Wenhai Sun et al., [31] proposed a privacy-preserving multi-keyword text search (MTS) with similarity-based ranking.
MTS utilizes tree-based indexing with adaption methods for a multi-dimensional algorithm.
Although MTS ensures privacy of search criteria and tree based index; however, it is based on
an assumption that subscriber searching the cloud storage always behaves honestly and cloud
server provider is honest-but-curious. Clearly, this assumption lack realism in the context of
public cloud based storage services which leverage subscribers to share and collaborate on outsourced data—an unauthorized subscriber can behave maliciously to learn presence of a particular keyword to deduce personal / confidential information which cannot be learned
otherwise. Similarly, [32] also provided multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted cloud
data using same assumption of honest-but-curious model. Oblivious Term Matching (OTM)
proposed an encrypted index oblivious search, where the index is computed over encrypted
outsourced data [33]. OTM obliviously evaluates conjunctive search queries, thus enabling
authorized subscribers to define complex selection criterion based on multiple keywords.
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Oblivious evaluation of search queries retrain untrusted cloud service provider from deducing
personal / confidential information which can lead to potential loss of privacy. However, OTM
evaluates exact matching function between a conjunctive search query and encrypted index
entries. In [34] authors proposed searchable symmetric encryption with conjunctive queries
focusing on scalability issues of encrypted data search. Similarly to others, the scheme did not
support relevance based search queries.
To overcome the limitations of exact matching between search criteria and outsourced data
Mehmet et al., [10] proposed efficient similarity search over encrypted data. To find relevance
between the search criteria and encrypted data they utilize a fast nearest neighbor search in
high dimensional space called locality sensitive hashing (LSH) [35]. Their search over
encrypted data scheme is based on secure index structure that is built through LSH, which
maps index entries into several buckets such that similar entries are stored into same buckets
whereas, dissimilar entries do not with high probability. Through rigorous security analysis
the authors showed that the proposed scheme was secure under adaptive semantic security for
searchable semantic encryption. However, to prevent cloud server from learning identifiers of
the outsourced data having close relevance with the search criteria, the authors proposed two
servers setting—where one server is responsible for persisting the outsourced data and second
server is in charge of evaluating search queries. Two servers setting is based on an assumption
that both servers do not collude with each other. This assumption seriously effects the practicality of the scheme when deployed to search confidential informational. Besides this, in a single server setting cloud server can successfully compromise privacy of the outsourced data by
learning its relevance with search criteria.
Fuzzy keyword search [21] is another search over encrypted data scheme designed specificity to search encrypted data outsourced to a public cloud storage service. It increases user
search experience by incorporating privacy-aware search queries which are resilient to typographical errors. It utilizes trapdoor based encryption to search encrypted index associated
with the outsourced data. To realize search over encrypted data scheme which is resilient to
typographical errors, it pre-compute all possible typographical errors of a keyword with a certain edit distance measure. Although the authors manage to address the typographical errors;
however, they mainly rely on exact matching between the pre-computed typographical errors
and trapdoors. Besides this, pre-computing all possible typographical errors can significant
increase the index size and as it is directly proportional to the value of edit distance used to
compute all possible misplaced keystrokes which many result in an error.
Jingwei Li et al., [36] proposed privacy-preserving data utilization in hybrid clouds—a privacy-aware data utilization (search and accessibility) service which can restrain unauthorized
subscribers from consuming data outsourced to a public cloud. The authors utilize hybrid
cloud architecture in which access control policies are enforced by the private cloud; whereas,
public cloud is responsible of persisting the outsourced data. To highlight efficacy of their system, the authors demonstrated fuzzy keyword search over encrypted data. In their hybrid
architecture fuzzy search queries are generated by the private cloud delegating computational
load of query formulation from user’s end to the cloud infrastructure. However, this type of
hybrid cloud configuration requires data management in private cloud thus obstructing
migration to public cloud and maximized utilization of public cloud infrastructure. Besides
this, their fuzzy keyword search mainly rely on pre-computing all possible typographical errors
and learning exact matching with the trapdoors—thus offering a primitive level of search experience. In [37] authors proposed an other fuzzy search over encrypted data to noisy search queries. The authors defined a closeness function (i.e., close, near or far) to evaluate similarity
between search query and outsourced data. Although considered to be a first significant effort
to realize fuzzy search over encrypted data; however, the defined closeness function was very
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primitive and cannot be extended to a notion of relevance i.e., matched and unmatched number of characters. Besides this, the scheme required large ciphertext in order to achieve fuzzy
behavior in searchable encryption.
Considering the rapid adoption of cloud based storage services, enterprise wide search
products like Google Search Appliance [18] and Microsoft Search Product [19] are leveraging
their subscribers to search outsourced data. These specialized products can be used to query
document repositories within the enterprise (private data centers) and public cloud based storage services as well. These products mainly rely on enterprise wide centralized index which is
maintained within the enterprise’s data center. All search queries are evaluated for the centralized index and access control policies are enforced over the search queries to prevent unauthorized subscribers from querying the index. Since, search service is hosted by the enterprise
itself, these search products greatly obstruct migration to cloud based storage services.
Research work concluded in [38] has shown that by carefully modelling search queries malicious subscribers can learn valuable information from the centralized index, even if they do
not have access to the data residing within private and public cloud based storage i.e., enterprise wide centralized index and outsourced data respectively.
Some recent developments in the area of search over encrypted data considered storage
overhead, read-efficiency, capability of handle large databases, and verification of search
results. In [39] authors constructed a searchable symmetric encryption scheme which provided
optimal locality, space overhead, and nearly-optimal read efficiency—where locality was
defined as maximum number of non-contiguous memory access that a server performed for
each search request, and read efficiency as a ratio between the number of bits the server reads
for each search request and the actual size of the answer. Distributed searchable symmetric
encryption scheme for large scale database was proposed in [40]. The scheme constructed Btree from a large scale database and performed encrypted search queries over the tree in two
servers setting model. The main server (data owner) stored the large scale database; whereas,
helper server was used to handle majority of the search queries. Verifiable searchable symmetric encryption scheme was proposed in [41] focusing on correctness and verifiability of the
search results. The authors demonstrated that the proposed scheme could be easily extended
to conjunctive and boolean queries.
In encrypted data search, factors like availability requirement of involved entities (cloud
service provider, trusted/semi-trusted third party, or a dedicated server), entity responsible of
evaluating server query, and ability to define search query (keywords) significantly affect the
practicality of the system. For instance, a system relying on a third party to process search queries would impose availability requirement on a cloud service provider and third party. Availability of a cloud service provider can be reasonably achieved through service level agreements
[42]; however for a third party, the system first needs to evaluate the trust and then keep track
of all the interactions to ensure third party is not colluding with cloud server provider. Besides
these factors, user’s ability to define its own search criteria, rather than simply relying on predefined trapdoors or encrypted search criteria and support for relevance based search query
are also important for the realism of an encrypted data search. These factors are specifically
important for achieving user experience which is close to normal search over plain text data.
Assumption on the involvement of a cloud service provider and third party as honest-butcurious entities significantly affects the overall working on the encrypted data search. Fig 1
presents a comparative analysis of existing methodologies with our proposed oblivious similarity based searching (OS2). As OS2 does not rely on a trusted third party to evaluate search
queries, it only requires availability of a cloud service provider which is well aligned with normal cloud service provisioning models. The main contribution of OS2 is relevance based
search over encrypted data (more details in Section 4) which can be reasonably extended to
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Fig 1. Comparative analysis of cloud based encrypted data search methodologies. Solid circle (●) represents availability requirement, entity
responsible to evaluate search request, support for user defined search criteria and relevance based search, and reliance on honest-but-curious
assumption. Hollow circle () represents factors which can be supported by an extended version of the system.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179720.g001

support user defined search criteria without any substantial modifications to the proposed
scheme.

3 System design and security goals and assumptions
3.1 System model
In a cloud based storage service scenario, we consider cloud service provider, data owner and
data consumer as involved entities. For simplicity these entities are referred as cloud server,
owner, and user respectively. Cloud server owns, manages and operates the cloud based storage service and provides access to its subscribers. Owner and user are subscribers of the cloud
server. Owner manages a shared repository which is used to outsource encrypted data. User
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has access privileges on the shared repository. Since outsourced data is in encrypted form, user
uses search query to identify and access only relevant data contents. Search query is evaluated
by the cloud server and search results are sent back to the user.

3.2 Security model
For the proposed oblivious similarity based search (OS2) we adopted the notion of security in
which any process performed on the data must not assist attacker(s) to deduce confidential
information about the data. Privacy of the data outsourced to a cloud storage can be ensured
by using cryptographic primitives. However, to access relevant data contents user must be able
to obliviously search the data. The oblivious execution of search query ensures that cloud
server cannot learn useful information by the query evaluation procedure, which can potentially compromise privacy of the outsourced data. To compromise privacy of the data, cloud
server can collude with malicious users to learn the absence or presence of a particular keyword. They can also collude to learn the result of a particular search query submitted by an
authorized user.

3.3 System design goals
The pivotal design goal of search over encrypted data is to enable subscribers to access relevant
encrypted data without compromising privacy. Relevant access of data ensures that users can
identify the encrypted which is most likely to contain the information they are searching for. A
system identifying relevance between the encrypted data and search queries must be resilient
to typographical error. Such a system will focus on similarity based matching instead of an
exact match between the encrypted data and search query. Another important factor which
must be considered is potential leakage of information which can be exploited by the cloud
server and malicious users to compromise privacy of the data. Thus, a system providing
encrypted data search should not reveal any information about the search results to the cloud
server and malicious users. The entire processing of encrypted query evaluation should remain
oblivious to the cloud server.
So, with OS2 we are realizing a privacy aware encrypted data search which can identify relevance between the encrypted data and concealed search queries. With these design goals,
cloud server will be unable to learn any information from the query evaluation process which
can be used to compromise privacy of the encrypted data and search query as well.

3.4 Assumptions and notations
Oblivious similarity based search (OS2) is specifically designed for public cloud based storage
services. To ensure end to end privacy of the encrypted data and involved entities, we consider
the cloud server as an untrusted entity. By untrusted entity, we mean that the cloud server tries
to learn absence or presence of a particular word in the encrypted data by analysis results of
search query. In order to search the encrypted data with privacy consideration, we assume that
the cloud server executes oblivious similarity based search honestly. However, the cloud server
can assist a malicious users to execute unauthorized search query to compromise privacy of
the encrypted data and involved entities. For brevity we intentionally neglected the details of
secure data sharing and only focused on privacy-aware relevant data access. Readers my refer
to [43] for details on privacy-aware data sharing in public cloud. We assume that there exists
an efficient indexing algorithm, which can extract important keywords from a file. To avoid
compatibility issues while evaluating encrypted search queries we assume that size of bloom filters and family of hash function are predetermined between the owner and authorized users.
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Table 1. Notations used in the descriptive detail of OS2.
Notation Description
F

File outsourced to a cloud based shared repository.

I

Index file consisting of n keywords kw0, kw1 . . . kwn.

πi

Bloom filter encoding kwi 2 I.

λ

Size of a bloom filter: total number of bit locations that can be marked as zero or one.

τ

Total number of bit position set to one in πi, irrespective of their location.

Bkw

Data structure consisting of hπ0, π1 . . . πni along with corresponding hτ0, τ1 . . . τni.

C

Search criteria containing a list of j search words (sw0, sw1 . . . swj).

ρi

Bloom filter encoding swi 2 C.

H

A family of hash functions which are used to encode kwi 2 I as πi and swi 2 C as ρi.

Q

A encrypted search query submitted to the cloud server. It contains hρ0, ρ1 . . . ρni and ϕ.

ϕ

Threshold value to filter hp0 ; p1 . . . pm i 2 Bkw to avoid unnecessary comparison operations
between the outsourced data and search criteria.

E S , DS

Symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms.

k

Secret key of symmetric encryption algorithms. It is shared with authorized users only.

E H , DH

Homomorphic encryption and decryption algorithms.

σpk, σsk

Public and secret key pair for homomorphic encryption algorithms.

~
D
0 ... jm

Oblivious result of search query evaluation which is received by a user from the cloud server.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179720.t001

For the sake of simplicity in the descriptive detail of oblivious similarity based search
(OS2), we use the notations shown in Table 1. F represents a file which is outsourced by the
owner to a shared repository. I is an index which is computed from F , it contains list of
important and frequently occurring keywords (kw0, kw1 . . . kwn). πi is a bloom filter which is
computed for kwi by using a predetermined sliding window size. H is a family of hash functions which are used to set bit locations in πi for each output of the sliding window over kwi. λ
represents the size of a bloom filter. τi is a total number of bit positions which are set to one in
πi. Bkw is a data structure which contains hπ0, π1 . . . πni in encrypted form, along with the corresponding hτ0, τ1 . . . τni. C is a search criteria containing list of search words (sw0, sw1 . . .
swj). ρi is a bloom filter which is computed for swi by using a predetermined sliding window
size. Q is a search query submitted by a user, it contains hρ0, ρ1 . . . ρji in encrypted form and a
numeric value ϕ to filter Bkw . ϕ is a threshold value for identifying encrypted bloom filters
which can produce higher value of similarity measure for encrypted search query evaluation.
E S , DS are symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms with a secert key k. E H , DH are
encryption and decryption algorithms from homomorphic cryptosystem, having (σpk, σsk) as
public and secret key pair. ~
D
is a result of oblivious search query evaluation.
0...jm

3.5 Preliminaries
In the following we describe Pascal Paillier (i.e., an additively homomorphic encryption)
scheme used to obliviously process bloom filters. For more cryptographic details and security
proof readers may refer to [23].
Key generation. Let p and q be two large primes and n = p.q. ϕ(n) denotes the euler’s totient function. λ(n) represents the carmicheal’s function. The product of two primes for n is
ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) and λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Over a multiplicative group of F n2 , these two
functions show the following properties:
jF n2 j ¼ ðn2 Þ ¼ n:ðnÞ
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and for any o 2 F n2
oðnÞ ¼ 1 ðmod nÞ

ð2Þ

onðnÞ ¼ 1 ðmod n2 Þ

ð3Þ

Public key PK is defined as (n, g), where g is an element of Zn2 , and λ(n) represents the secret
key SK.
Encryption. To encrypt a message m 2 Zn , randomly choose y 2R Zn2 , and define an
encryption function E H , such that:
E H : Zn  Zn 7! Zn2

ð4Þ

E H ðm; yÞ ¼ g m yn ðmod n2 Þ

ð5Þ

Decryption. To decrypt the ciphertext c, L is defined as (u − 1)/n, 8u 2 {u|u = 1(mod n)}.
c can be decrypted by using secret key SK ¼ lðnÞ, Dg as
DH ðc; lðnÞÞ ¼

LðclðnÞ ðmod n2 ÞÞ
Lðg lðnÞ ðmod n2 ÞÞ

ð6Þ

Oblivious computation. Arithmetic addition between two ciphertexts, c1 ¼ E H ðm1 ; y1 Þ
and c2 ¼ E H ðm2 ; y2 Þ, is evaluated as:
E H ðm1 ; y1 Þ

¼ g m1 y1 n ðmod n2 Þ

E H ðm2 ; y2 Þ ¼ g m2 y2 n ðmod n2 Þ
n
E H ðm1 ; y1 Þ:E H ðm2 ; y2 Þ ¼ g m1 þm2 ðy1 :y2 Þ ðmod n2 Þ

ð7Þ

¼ E H ðm1 þ m2 Þ

4 Oblivious similarity based search: OS2
4.1 Initialization
The owner creates a shared repository on the cloud server which is used to persist outsourced
data shared with authorized users. It then generates k for E S and DS to ensure privacy of F in
an untrusted domain. To enable privacy-aware relevant data access the owner also initializes
homomorphic cryptosystem by generating a key pair (σpk, σsk). Homomorphic public key (σpk)
is shared with the cloud server and authorized users. σpk facilitates cloud service provider to
obviously evlauate encrypted search queries submitted by users. Homomorphic secret key
(σsk) is only shared with authorized users to enable them to query shared repository and access
relevant outsourced data. An authorized user utilizes σpk to encrypt search queries and σsk to
decipher oblivious research results. Key shared with an authorized user can be considered as a
key-pair (σpk, σsk); where correct usage of each key is determined by the context. Initialization
and sharing of cryptographic keys is only carried out once, after that involved entities can use
them to evaluate encrypted search queries without compromising privacy of the outsourced
data.
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Fig 2. Encoding keyword kw[0 . . . n] as a bloom filter of length λ, with fixed window size.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179720.g002

4.2 Bloom filter based secure indexing
Once all the necessary cryptographic primitives are initialized, the owner generates I from F ,
using an efficient indexing algorithm. I contains all the important keywords (kw0, kw1 . . . kwn)
that constitute F . The owner can add or remove keywords from I, to ensure that authorized
users can search it accordingly. After that, the owner selects publicly known H, which are then
used to encode hkw0 ; kw1 . . . kwn i 2 I as bloom filters (π0, π1. . .πn). For each kwi 2 I, the
owner uses a predetermined window size to encode kwi as πi. Each output of the sliding window
is added to πi by using H. Fig 2 illustrates the encoding of a keyword as a bloom filter with sliding window. Once kwi is encoded to πi, the owner counts the number of bit locations set to one
to compute τi, which is used to reduce the search space. However, τi itself do not reveal any
information about the actual keyword.
Since, the owner has utilized publicly known family of hash functions to generate
hπ0, π1 . . . πni, an entity (cloud server and malicious users) with malicious intents can compromise privacy of F , by encoding a keyword (kw?) of its own choice as π? and comparing it with
hπ0, π1 . . . πni. To restrain a malicious entity from deducing confidential information, each bit
s
location of πi is concealed with homomorphic encryption i.e., E H ðpi ; spk Þ ¼ pi pk . This ensures
s

that the cloud server is able to process individual bit location in pi pk without compromising
s
s
s
s
privacy of F . Once, pi pk is secured, the owner adds hp0pk ; p1 pk . . . pnpk i and the corresponding
hτ0, τ1 . . . τni to Bkw .
Since, each bit location of πi is encrypted with probabilistic homomorphic encryption, malicious entities cannot differentiate between bit locations set to zero and one. Thus, restraining
them from inferring confidential information by analyzing bloom filter (π?) of an arbitrary
s
s
s
keyword (kw?) with hp0pk ; p1pk . . . pnpk i.
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4.3 Data outsourcing
Once the privacy of Bkw is ensured through homomorphic encryption, the owner encrypts F
with E S i.e., E S ðF ; kÞ ! F k and outsources F k ; Bkw and σpk to the cloud server. After that the
availability of owner is not required. Authorized users can engage in an oblivious query evaluation with the cloud server and access relevant data accordingly.

4.4 Query generation
User having a valid secret key (σsk) can successfully query shared repository to identify outsourced data which are most relevant to its search query. To model an encrypted query for similarity based search the user defines C which contains a list of search words (sw0, sw1 . . . swj). By
using H the user then encodes hsw0 ; sw1 . . . swj i 2 C as hρ0, ρ1 . . . ρji. A predetermined windows size is used to encode swi as ρi. This enables OS2 to model encrypted search queries to
learn a relevance between the outsourced data and search criteria specified by a user.
Since, cloud server can exploit the bit locations of hρ0, ρ1 . . . ρji to compromise privacy of
k
F , the user encrypts them by using σpk shared by the owner during the initialization phase
s
i.e., E H ðri ; spk Þ ! ri pk . Since, each bit location in ρi is encrypted probabilistically by using
homomorphic encryption, cloud server cannot differentiate between two different bit location,
even if both of them are set to same value.
Once, C is encoded as hρ0, ρ1 . . . ρji and concealed with σpk, the user transmits the encrypted
s
s
s
search query Q to the cloud server. Q contains hr0 pk ; r1 pk . . . rj pk i and a threshold value (ϕ)
s

s

s

which is used by the cloud server to filter hp0pk ; p1pk . . . pmpk i 2 Bkw where m  n.

4.5 Query evaluation
The size of bloom filter and family of hash functions that encode hkw0 ; kw1 . . . kwn i 2 I and
hsw0 ; sw1 . . . swj i 2 C are same. This enables OS2 to leverage cloud server to obliviously
s

s

s

s

s

s

match hp0pk ; p1 pk . . . pnpk i with hr0 pk ; r1 pk . . . rj pk i. On receiving Q the cloud server filters Bkw
s

s

s

by using ϕ and identifies hp0 pk ; p1 pk . . . pmpk i having hτ0 = ϕ, τ1 = ϕ . . . τm = ϕi.
Once the cloud server has filtered bloom filters from Bkw it starts the bitwise oblivious addis
s
s
s
s
s
~ by adding
tion on hp0pk ; p1pk . . . pnpk i and hr0pk ; r1 pk . . . rj pk i. It computes oblivious vector D
i

s

s

pk
bit location of ri pk ½x with the corresponding bit location of p0...m
½x; where, x refers to a bit
location in bloom filter, having value from 0 to λ. The cloud server performs the oblivious
addition operation on bit locations by using σpk, which is shared by the owner in the initialization phase. In total cloud server perform j × m oblivious additions.
s
~
After that cloud server replies D
to the user. Since, each bit location of pi pk 2 Q and

0...ðjmÞ

spk
i

r 2 Bkw is probabilistically concealed, the cloud server cannot deduce any information by
simply comparing them, even if bloom filters are exactly same i.e., an authorized user is searching for an arbitrary sw? which is exactly same as kwi. Besides this, oblivious addition also
s
spk
restrains the cloud server from learning the result of addition perform on ri pk ½x and p0...m
½x,
where (0  i  j) and (0  x  λ).

4.6 Result post-processing
~
The authorized user can learn the result of encrypted search query by deciphering D
0...ðjmÞ
with σsk. From deciphered bit locations it only needs to count total number of bit locations
that are set to zero and two. These are the values which match with the corresponding bit
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s

s

s

location in hp0pk ; p1pk . . . pmpk i. To measure the level of similarity between the encrypted search
query and outsourced data it also counts the number of bit locations that are set to one.
Since, bloom filter encodes hkw0, kw1 . . . kwni and hsw0, sw1 . . . swji as vector of zero and
one the oblivious addition of a bit location can only result in zero, one and two. Whenever
there is match between bit locations set to one the result is always two. For bit locations set to
zero the result can only be zero. Since, we are dealing with zero and one values in case of a mismatch the result of oblivious addition in always be one.
Once user has identified matched and mismatched bit locations it uses Jaccard similarity
coefficient to learn the relevance between the search criteria and outsourced data. Jaccard similarity coefficient is shown in Eq 8.
8
spk
spk
>
< 0 matched :ru ½x ¼ 0; pv ½x ¼ 0
s
s
s
s
x ¼ 1 mismatched :rupk ½x ¼ 0; pv pk ½x ¼ 1 orrupk ½x ¼ 1; pv pk ½x ¼ 0
ð8Þ
>
:
spk
spk
2 matched :ru ½x ¼ 1; pv ½x ¼ 1
where x is a bit location in a bloom filter having value 0  x  λ. u and v are bloom filters from
encrypted search query and index having 0  u  j and 0  v  m respectively.
total number of bits set to zero
þ
s

s

simðrupk ; pv pk Þ ¼

total number of bits set to one
l

ð9Þ

where sim(.) is Jaccard similarity coefficient.
With Jaccard similarity coefficient the user can identify how closely search query matches
with the outsourced data. Since, the user has learned the matched and mismatched bit locations it can also apply other similarly measures according to its needs, dice co-efficient, cosine
measure, to name a few.

5 Implementation
The proposed system of similarity based encrypted data search is implemented as a cloud service and depktop client application. Cloud service is deployed on Google App Engine [44], it is
s
s
s
mainly responsible for persisting encrypted bloom filters (p0pk ; p1pk . . . pnpk ) and obliviously
evaluating the search queries (Q). Depktop client application is utilized to generate inverted
index (I ) from the data (F ) before it can be outsourced to a public cloud storage service. It is
s
s
s
also responsible for modeling encrypted search criteria ðr0 pk ; r1pk . . . rj pk Þ and post process the
~
query evaluation results (D
).
0...ðjmÞ

To generate inverted index we utilize Apache Lucene [45], a high performance, full-featured text search engine library. We utilize open source implementation of bloom filter [46] to
encode inverted index entries (kw0 ; kw1 . . . kwn 2 I) as bit strings of 0 and 1 i.e., π0, π1 . . . πn,
generated by using a sliding window method illustrated in Fig 2. For our implementation we
use sliding window of size two to encode inverted index entries as bloom filters. We observe
that sliding window of size two is more resilient to typographical errors. This is because
with sliding window size two a single typographical error is encoded twice at tl and tm
(where l < m). For a higher value a misplaced character is encoded g times, where g is the size
of sliding window.
For oblivious evaluation of search queries in an untrusted domain we utilize Pascal Paillier
cryptosystem. Bloom filter bit locations for hπ0, π1 . . . πni and hρ0, ρ1 . . . ρmi are encrypted
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with secret key (σsk) of Pascal Paillier cryptosystem. Whereas, set bit location counter (τ) is
stored in plain form to ensure that cloud server can retrieve relevant encrypted bloom filters.
s
s
s
We utilize App Engine Datastore to persist hp0pk ; p1pk . . . pmpk i and τ. On each search request
s
s
s
cloud server filter hp0pk ; p1pk . . . pnpk i based on threshold value ϕ, and perform homomorphic
spk
spk
spk
s
s
s
~
addition between hp0 ; p1 . . . pm i and hr0pk ; r1pk . . . rj pk i by using σpk and replies D
to
0...ðjmÞ

the client application.

6 Evaluation
The efficacy of our proposed similarity data search over encrypted data is tested by evaluating
on desktop client application and Google App Engine cloud service. The client application and
cloud service are implemented in Java using jdk 1.7.0. We use 64-bit Windows 7 machine having 3.40 GHz Intel Xeon processor and 8.0 GB main memory. Cloud service is tested on F4
and F4_G1 front-end instance classes having processing and main memory capacity as (1.2
GHz, 0.25 GB) and (2.4 GHz, 1.0 GB) respectively.
For evaluation we consider the time required to compute secure probabilistic data structure
and execution overhead of oblivious comparison in Google App Engine. In the following evaluation the client application is utilized to generate secure bloom filters from the inverted
index. It is also responsible for post processing the oblivious results which are replied by the
cloud server. Result post processing is used to learn relevance between the search criteria and
encrypted bloom filters persisted by App Engine Datastore. For cloud service, we consider the
time required to obliviously add corresponding bit locations of secure bloom filters which
encodes the search criteria and inverted index.
In this evaluation we use randomly generated English keywords. Fig 3 shows the distribus
s
s
tion of keywords use to generate encrypted index entries hp0pk ; p1pk . . . pnpk i 2 Bkw .

Fig 3. Keyword length distribution.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179720.g003
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6.1 Secure bloom filter modeling and result post processing
For secure bloom filter modeling we utilize windows size of 2. Each keyword of length n is
divided into n − 1 chunks, where every chunk is encoded as bloom filter entry. For every keyword we compute a single bloom filter which is populated with n − 1 entries. Once keyword is
encoded as a bloom filter, we count the total number of bit locations which are set to 1. After
that entire bloom filter is encrypted using Pascal Paillier cryptosystem. Key size of 256 bits is
utilized to encrypt the bloom filter (the proposed methodology can be extended to any key size
based on security and computational requirements). Since Pascal Paillier is semantically
secure, the encryption of every bit location in bloom filter resulted in a different value. This is
because for each bit location Pascal Paillier utilizes a different random value r during the
encryption process.
Post processing of oblivious results depends on threshold value used for selective retrieval
of index entries at the cloud server. For this evaluation we utilize threshold value of 2. This
ensure that search criteria is only compared with index entries having total set bit locations
within the range τ ± 2. Post processing of oblivious results comprise of two steps. First,
response of cloud server is deciphered by using Pascal Paillier i.e., every single bit location of
oblivious result is decrypted. At this step similarity between the criteria and encrypted index is
identified by learning deciphered values. 0 and 2 are regarded as matched; whereas, 1 is considered as a mismatched, see Eq 8. Second, once matched and mismatched values are identify
we compute the similarity measure. For this evaluation we utilize Jaccard Similarity (see Eq 9)
measure.
Fig 4 illustrates the time required to model secure bloom filter along with the execution
overhead of result post processing. For this evaluation we utilized bloom filter having 50, 75,

Fig 4. Secure bloomfilter modeling and oblivious result post processing time (sec).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179720.g004
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100, and 125 bit length and 1, 2, 3 and 4 hash functions respectively. These hash functions are
utilized to set bit locations in a bloom filter. Thus the output of sliding windows (i.e., chunk) is
encoded k times, where k is the total number of hash functions used to populate bloom filter.
Secure bloom filter modeling shows the linear increase in execution time. With the increase in
bloom filter size we also increased the number of hash functions to set respective bit locations.
Since, every bit location in bloom filter is encrypted regardless of its values (0 or 1) the increase
is execution time is mainly because of increase number of bit locations.
We utilize threshold value to avoid comparing search criteria with every index entry. Execution overhead shown in Fig 4 is mainly effected by the number of index entries having set
bit locations within the range of threshold τ ± 2.

6.2 Oblivious result processing
Oblivious processing of search criteria is comprised of two steps. In the first step encrypted
index entries are retrieved from the App Engine Datastore. The entries are retrieved according
to the threshold value (τ ± 2). Once all relevant index entries are retrieved in the second step
the cloud server performs homomorphic addition operation on corresponding bit locations of
search criteria and encrypted index. The homomorphic addition operation obliviously results
in 0, 1 or 2, see Eq 8.
Fig 5 shows the time required to obliviously add encrypted bloom filters of search criteria
and index entry. In this evaluation we ignore the time required to retrieve index entries since it
is proportional to size of index. We utilized Google App Engine Frontend classed of F4 and
F4_1G. Encrypted search criteria is oblivious added to 25 bloom filters. We evaluated execution overhead for bloom filter having 50, 75, 100, and 125 bit length. Fig 5 shows the response

Fig 5. Execution overhead of oblivious evaluation of search criteria on Google App Engine (sec).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179720.g005
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time (ms) and CPU Time cpu_ms. Time required to complete the oblivious addition and transmit oblivious result to the user is measured as ms whereas, estimated CPU cycles that can be
performed by a 1.2 GHz Intel x86 processor in that amount of time [47].

7 Security analysis
This section presents security analysis of OS2. The analysis will focus on the capabilities of
malicious cloud server and users to infer confidential information from the oblivious matching
of bloom filters i.e., index entries and search queries modelled as bloom filters. Particularly, we
will focus on cloud server’s advantage in exploiting oblivious matching of bloom filters bit
locations. For malicious users, we will focus on users’ abilities to post unauthorized search queries and learn useful information by post-processing the search results.
The proposed methodology utilizes bloom filters and homomorphic encryption to realize
encrypted data search which is capable of supporting typographical errors or misspelled search
criteria. As from the descriptive details of OS2, bloom filters are used to store output of sliding
window over a particular keyword (i.e., index entry and user defined search criteria). Bits locations are then used to identify similarities between index entries and search criteria. Homomorphic encryption is employed by OS2 to ensure only authorized users (i.e., users having
public and secret key pair) are able to post encrypted search queries and successfully decipher
the response through post-processing. OS2 also utilizes symmetric encryption to encrypt outsourced data—however, the main focus of OS2 is to facilitate similarity based search through
oblivious evaluation of search queries. For the security analysis of homomorphic and symmetric encryptions, readers can refer to [23] and [48] respectively. In the following, we examine
the capabilities of malicious cloud server and users to directly or indirectly infer confidential
information from the oblivious processing of bloom filters.

7.1 Malicious cloud server
Instead of relying on a trusted third party OS2 utilizes the computational power and storage
facility of a cloud server to execute search queries. The cloud server uses encrypted index Bkw
s
s
s
comprising of encrypted bloom filter bit locations hp0 pk ; p1pk . . . pnpk i and for each bloom filter
a count of bit locations set to one hτ0, τ1 . . . τni, to process search requests.
To compromise privacy of the outsourced data, the cloud server needs to decipher the outsourced data F k . The computational complexity to decipher F k is equivalent to that of symmetric encryption [48] as k is never shared by the data owner. The cloud server is also
responsible for storing encrypted index Bkw and evaluating encrypted search queries Q subs
s
s
mitted in the form of hr0pk ; r1pk . . . rj pk i and a threshold ϕ used to narrow down the search
space. To decipher the encrypted index and infer useful information from oblivious matching
the cloud server needs the homomorphic encryption secret key σsk. Only authorized users have
access to σsk as it is distributed by the data owner during the initialization phase (although not
explicitly mentioned k can be distributed during the initialization phase without requiring any
modification to OS2, besides the encryption of k with authorized users’ public keys). Thus, for
a cloud server the computational complexity to infer useful information from the oblivious
matching of bloom filter bit locations is equivalent to that of Pascal Paillier cryptosystem [23].

7.2 Malicious users
OS2 enables authorized users to successfully learn from the response of the cloud server. A
~
authorized user utilizes secret key (σsk) to decipher the result of query evaluation (D
). To
0...ðjmÞ

k

compromise privacy of the outsourced data F and encrypted index Bkw , a malicious user
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would need the secret keys i.e., k to decrypt F k using symmetric encryption, and σsk to deci~
pher D
. Since, σsk is only shared with authorized users during the initialization phase, a
0...ðjmÞ

malicious user cannot decipher the result of a search query. Thus, the computational complexity of successfully inferring useful information is equivalent to that of Pascal Paillier cryptosystem [23].
Although a malicious cannot successfully infer any useful information from the response of
a cloud server, it can post unauthorized search queries. This is mainly due to the fact that
search queries are encrypted with homomorphic encryption public key σpk. Any malicious
user having access to σpk can post search queries; however, σsk is required to decipher the
search results. As σsk is only shared with authorized users, a malicious user would not be able
to successfully infer any useful information. This can be regarded as unsuccessfully attempt by
a malicious user as nothing more than the original keyword used to model the search query
can be learned. To restrain malicious users from posting unsuccessful search queries, access
control policies can be utilized which are beyond the scope and main objectives of OS2.

8 Conclusion and future work
In data driven applications (or services) data accessibility plays an important role to access and
consume desired data contents by using search queries. However, the capability of relevant
data access is significantly reduced to merely exact matching when user tries to securely search
encrypted data persisted in an untrusted domain. This is because conventional search over
encrypted data methodologies are mainly designed to ensure confidentiality of search queries
and do not consider user’s search experience. In this work we presented oblivious similarity
based search for encrypted data (OS2). It leveraged authorized subscriber(s) of a public cloud
storage service to obliviously learn relevance between user defined encrypted search criteria
and outsourced data. Unlike conventional methodologies which mainly rely on computationally intensive private matching protocol or trapdoor based cryptography to search encrypted
data, OS2 utilized homomorphic addition over secure probabilistic data structure to learn
similarity measure between search query and encrypted data. With OS2 search queries were
evaluated within the untrusted domain of cloud service provider without relying on trusted/
semi trusted entities. This enabled us to fully utilize computational facilities of public cloud
service provider. Evaluation of OS2 on Google App Engine highlighted the fact that it exerted
amicable execution load on involved entities; whereas, offloading computational load on public cloud without compromising confidentiality and privacy of search query and outsourced
data.
With this research we have demonstrated that it is possible to obliviously search encrypted
data with search queries which are resilient to typographical errors. Another interesting yet
challenging direction for similarity based encrypted data search is contextually informed privacy-aware search. Sensing and actuating devices in internet-of-things can benefits from it by
accessing private and confidential sensed data within a given context.
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